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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
REGULATORY AND PHYSICAL TAKINGS 
AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
Zachary C. Kleinsasser*
Abstract: In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court 
held that, when a regulation has deprived a landowner of all economically 
beneªcial use, a threshold issue in determining whether compensation is 
due is whether the landowner’s rights of ownership are conªned by the 
limitations on the use of land which “inhere in the title itself.” For land 
that may fall within the public trust doctrine, Lucas’s threshold determina-
tion has signiªcant consequences. Because the public trust doctrine is a 
“background principle,” buyers and sellers of real property may not be 
able to claim full title, and should be cognizant of the potential applica-
tion of the doctrine to their land. Further, state and local regulatory bod-
ies should strategically employ the public trust doctrine in environmental 
protection regulation. Finally, the public trust doctrine’s role in a takings 
analysis suggests that property rights are perhaps more communal than 
generally acknowledged, and reveals that it may make sense to evaluate 
property rights from a community-based perspective. 
By the law of nature these three things are common to mankind—the air, 
running water, [and] the sea.1
—Justinian Institute 
Introduction 
 Rooted in Roman law, cultivated in medieval England, and reªned 
during more than two centuries of American jurisprudence, the public 
trust doctrine is a powerful legal principle to which society has fre-
quently turned in order to preserve public uses of property.2 By con-
trast, takings jurisprudence was borne out of the need for private land-
owners to guard against overreaching public laws and governmental 
                                                                                                                      
* Clinical Program Director, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2004–2005. B.A., Albion College, 2001. 
1 J. Inst. 2.1.1, quoted in Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 
P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983). 
2 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial In-
tervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 473, 475–78, 556–57 (1970). 
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intrusion;3 it contemplates the often obscure line between an individ-
ual’s “bundle of rights” and the necessity of government regulation.4
 Differences between the rationales underlying the public trust 
doctrine and takings jurisprudence highlight a fundamental tension 
in American property law.5 On one hand, land is a tool for human use 
and consumption, an entity that, lying in its natural state, is expend-
able.6 It can be bought, sold, and owned.7 On the other hand, land is 
not passive, nor is it capable of being parceled by humans.8 Rather, 
land is active and composed of functional, interconnected, ecological 
systems.9 The former, called the “transformative economy” by Profes-
sor Sax and others, supports the notion that title to land endows pri-
vate use rights;10 the latter, labeled the “economy of nature,” suggests 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (noting that if “the uses 
of private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualiªcation under the 
police power, ‘the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the 
qualiªcation more and more until at last private property disappear[ed]’” (quoting Pa. 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (alteration in original)); Jennifer Dick & 
Andrew Chandler, Shifting Sands: The Implementation of Lucas on the Evolution of Takings Law 
and South Carolina’s Application of the Rule, 37 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 637, 640–44 (2003) 
(describing the origin of regulatory takings as a product of a shift in property law from an 
emphasis on state police power to protection of individual private ownership rights). 
4 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027; Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council Protect Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-o-Links, and Other Things That Go 
Bump in the Night, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 849, 855–56, 876–77, 901 (2000). Principally, property 
consists of a “bundle of rights”: the right to possess, the right to use, the right to exclude, 
and the right to transfer. Jesse Dukeminier & James Krier, Property 93 (5th ed. 2002). 
Not all forms of property, however, enjoy the same bundle of rights; in some circum-
stances, the law restricts or prohibits the enjoyment of certain rights. See Babcock, supra, at 
855 n.25. 
5 See generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Na-
ture, Law, and Society 1065–68 (3d ed. 2004) (providing an overview of the public trust 
doctrine, and noting that as a result of the doctrine private property owners do not enjoy 
unfettered use rights); Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does 
That Say About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute “Takings”?, 80 
Iowa L. Rev. 297, 308–21 (1995) (explaining that the the “competing legal themes”—the 
Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on taking private property for public use without just 
compensation and statutes imposing restrictions on the use of public and private prop-
erty—“are easily stated”); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Under-
standing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1433, 1442–46 (1993) 
(discussing “two fundamentally different views of property rights”—the “transformative 
economy” and the “economy of nature”—in the wake of Lucas). 
6 See Sax, supra note 5, at 1442. 
7 See id. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. at 1442–46. 
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that private land use is burdened by the community’s interest in its 
use and enjoyment.11
 This Note examines the hotly contested marriage of the public 
trust doctrine and takings—and the tension between their underlying, 
competing rationales—in the modern takings analysis.12 It argues that 
the public trust doctrine necessarily informs any regulatory and physi-
cal takings analysis. Part II examines the history of the public trust doc-
trine, and Part III reviews the modern takings analysis. Exploring the 
application of the public trust doctrine in recent takings cases, Parts IV 
and V demonstrate that the doctrine underlies a modern takings analy-
sis. Part IV focuses on categorical regulatory takings cases, concentrat-
ing in particular on how the public trust doctrine embodies a Lucas13 
background principle. Part V illustrates how the doctrine informs the 
Penn Central14 balancing test. Part VI concludes by identifying several 
important lessons that an application of the public trust doctrine to the 
takings analysis provides: (1) buyers and sellers of real property should 
be informed about applicable background principles; (2) regulatory 
bodies should strategically employ the public trust doctrine in envi-
ronmental protection regulation; and (3) property rights should be 
conceptualized within a community-based paradigm. 
I. The Public Trust Doctrine 
 The public trust doctrine was ªrst formally declared in the ªfth 
century A.D. by the Justinian Institute: “By the law of nature these 
three things are common to mankind—the air, running water, [and] 
the sea.”15 From its origin in Roman law, the English common law de-
veloped the concept of the public trust, under which the Crown 
owned all navigable waterways and the lands lying beneath them “as 
                                                                                                                      
11 See also Babcock, supra note 4, at 855–56, 892–94, 901–02 (arguing that “enforcing 
laws that embody common law communal norms . . . is one way of returning to a view of 
property in which landowners recognize their obligations toward society as a whole”). 
12 Compare David Callies & J. David Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in Takings 
Law: Background Principles, Custom and Public Trust “Expectations” and the (Mis)Use of Invest-
ment-Backed Expectations, 36 Val. U. L. Rev. 339, 372–79 (2002) (arguing that the public 
trust doctrine should be limited to its traditional scope in order to be considered a back-
ground principle in takings analysis), with Timothy J. Dowling, On History, Takings Jurispru-
dence, and Palazzolo: A Reply to James Burling, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 65, 90–91 (2002) 
(positing that background principles in takings analysis may include a “reasonable exten-
sion” of the public trust doctrine). 
13 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
14 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
15 J. Inst. 2.1.1, quoted in Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 
P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983). 
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trustee of a public trust for the beneªt of the people.”16 With the 
American Revolution, trust resources previously owned by the Crown 
passed to the American public in the thirteen states via the equal foot-
ing doctrine.17 Each state was thus vested with the duty to hold public 
resources in trust for the people of the state.18 The purpose of the 
trust was to preserve certain resources in a manner that made them 
available to the public for use.19 In England, the Sovereign’s title to 
land was split into two interests: the jus publicum, the public’s right to 
use and enjoy trust lands, and the jus privatum, the private property 
rights that existed in the use and possession of trust lands.20
 In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court ad-
vanced the seminal modern expression of the public trust doctrine, 
holding that a state legislature’s grant of land to a railroad company 
was “necessarily revocable.”21 “The trust,” the Court explained, “can-
not be relinquished by a transfer of property.”22 It continued, “The 
State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole 
                                                                                                                      
16 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 718 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
17 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 472–74 (1988). The equal footing 
doctrine provides that, within their borders, the original thirteen states and those succeed-
ing them inherited public trust rights equal to those previously held by the Crown. Id. 
(citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894)). The Court in Phillips Petroleum turned to 
Shively when it articulated the equal footing doctrine: 
 At common law, the title and the dominion in lands ºowed by the tide 
were in the King for the beneªt of the nation. . . . Upon the American Revo-
lution, these rights, charged with a like trust, were vested in the original 
States within their respective borders, subject to the rights surrendered by the 
Constitution to the United States. 
 . . . . 
 The new States admitted into the Union since the adoption of the Consti-
tution have the same rights as the original States in the tide waters, and in the 
lands under them, within their respective jurisdictions. 
Shively, 152 U.S. at 57. 
18 See Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 474–74; infra Part VI.B. 
19 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892); Susan D. Baer, The Public 
Trust Doctrine—A Tool to Make Federal Administrative Agencies Increase Protection of Public Land 
and Its Resources, 15 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 385, 386–87 (1988). 
20 See McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 2003); Callies & 
Breemer, supra note 12, at 339–40. The ancient Roman purpose for the public trust doc-
trine endures today, creating a legal obligation for governments to protect trust resources. 
See infra Part VI.B. As Professor Joseph Sax explained, “[o]f all the concepts known to 
American law, only the public trust doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive 
content which might make it useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to 
develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems.” Sax, supra 
note 2, at 474 (footnote omitted). 
21 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892). 
22 Id. at 453. 
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people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them . . . 
than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of gov-
ernment and the preservation of the peace.”23 As Professor Joseph 
Sax, who reinvigorated the public trust doctrine in the early 1970s,24 
famously explained: 
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free 
use of the general public, a court will look with considerable 
skepticism on any governmental conduct which is calculated 
either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to 
subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties.25
 Since Illinois Central, courts and state legislatures have slowly ex-
panded the public trust doctrine.26 While once limited to navigable and 
tidal waters, the doctrine has crept from beaches and rivers to lakes, 
tributaries, riparian banks, and now encompasses aquifers, marshes, wet-
lands, springs, and groundwater.27  The public trust doctrine also in-
cludes non-water natural resources. 28  By the late twentieth century, 
courts had explicitly included beach access, 29  trees and forests, 30  
parks,31 wildlife,32 fossil beds,33 and whole ecosystems34 under the doc-
trine’s increasingly broad umbrella.35
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. at 453–54. 
24 See Anne C. Dowling, “Un-Locke-ing” a “Just Right” Environmental Regime: Overcoming 
the Three Bears of International Environmentalism—Sovereignty, Locke, and Compensation, 26 Wm. 
& Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 891, 930 n.160 (2002); see also Fred Shapiro, The Most-Cited 
Law Review Articles, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1540, 1551, 1553 (1985) (determining that Sax’s public 
trust article was among the 40 law review articles most often cited by other law review arti-
cles over the preceding 40 years). 
25 Sax, supra note 2, at 490. 
26 See, e.g., Dick & Chandler, supra note 3, at 693–94 (discussing state expansion of pub-
lic trust doctrine); Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings Notice Rule, 24 U. Haw. L. Rev. 
533, 579–82 (describing expansion of the public trust doctrine); Serena M. Williams, Sus-
taining Urban Green Spaces: Can Public Parks Be Protected Under the Public Trust Doctrine?, 10 
S.C. Envtl. L.J. 23, 30–40 (2002) (explaining how states have expanded the public trust 
doctrine); see also infra notes 27–40 and accompanying text. 
27 See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445–47 (Haw. 2000) (holding 
that “the public trust doctrine applies to all water resources without exception or distinc-
tion”); Anna R.C. Caspersen, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Impossibility of “Tak-
ings” by Wildlife, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 357, 366–69 (1996). 
28 See supra note 26; infra notes 29–35 and accompanying text. 
29 See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 369 (N.J. 1984). 
30 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Dep’t of the Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 95–96 (D. Cal. 1974) 
(holding that, in addition to statutory requirements, trust obligation mandated full protec-
tion of timber, soil, and streams). 
31 See, e.g., Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 15–16 (Ill. 1970) (holding 
that a public park was held “in trust for the uses and purposes speciªed and for the beneªt 
of the public”). 
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 A central feature of the public trust doctrine is that rules govern-
ing the use of natural resources exist in a dynamic relationship with 
evolving values of the community.36 As the New Jersey Supreme Court 
explained in Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, “The 
public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should not be 
considered ªxed or static, but should be molded and extended to 
meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to 
beneªt.”37 Because the public trust doctrine is infused with commu-
nal obligations—and therefore implicates the relationship between 
the public and the public’s use and enjoyment of its land—it has been 
                                                                                                                      
32 See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896) (holding that wild animals 
are not the private property of those whose land they occupy, but are instead a sort of 
common property whose control and regulation are to be exercised “as a trust for the 
beneªt of the people”), overruled on other grounds by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 
(1979); see also Caspersen, supra note 27, at 369, 374–84. 
33 See Plater et al., supra note 5, at 1091–92. 
34 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 
1983) (holding that “[t]he human and environmental uses of Mono Lake—uses protected 
by the public trust doctrine—deserve to be taken into account”); Marks v. Whitney, 491 
P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (holding that San Francisco Bay should be preserved in its natu-
ral state so that the lands “may serve as ecological units for scientiªc study, as open space, 
and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life”); see also 
Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in Search of 
a Theory, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 393, 405–06 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
implicit extension of the public trust doctrine beyond water rights in Illinois Central and 
Phillips Petroleum suggests that ecological boundaries may be replacing the previous naviga-
bility test). 
35 See Caspersen, supra note 27, at 357, 359, 365–69 (noting that wildlife, like air and 
water, is held in trust by the government for the public’s beneªt). The Hawaii Constitution 
explicitly includes a broad range of public resources: “the State . . . shall conserve and 
protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, miner-
als and energy sources.” Haw. Const. art. XI, § 1. Moreover, in requiring an afªrmative 
duty by the state to take the public trust into account in In re Water Use Permit Applications, 
the Hawaii Supreme Court refused to “deªne the full extent of article XI, section 1’s refer-
ence to ‘all public resources,’” ostensibly leaving open the possibility of broader applica-
tion of the public trust doctrine. See 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000). 
36 See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 
1972). 
37 Id.; see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw. 2000) (hold-
ing that “[t]he public trust, by its very nature, does not remain ªxed for all time, but must 
conform to changing needs and circumstances”). Soft-sand shorelines, for example, dem-
onstrate the need for an ever-evolving public trust doctrine. Dick & Chandler, supra note 3, 
at 695. While shorelines along rocky coasts do not change, many coastal states south of 
Massachusetts and soft-sand states along the gulf coast and the Paciªc Ocean face dramatic 
erosion and coastal migration of barrier beaches. Id. Protecting public trust land in rocky 
coast states is easier to administer, as these states do not have changing boundaries. See id. 
In soft-sand coastal states, however, it is crucial that public trust lands shift with migrating 
boundaries. Id. 
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used by many states to buttress environmental protection regula-
tions.38 Purporting to act as trustee on behalf of the beneªciary pub-
lic, legislatures and state agencies have enacted or promulgated myr-
iad restrictions on the use and development of trust land.39 As the 
public trust doctrine has gradually expanded to “meet changing con-
ditions and needs of the public,” so have land use restrictions gradu-
ally grown to encompass historically consistent, but nevertheless 
novel, natural resources.40
II. Takings 
 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents the gov-
ernment from taking “private property . . . for public use, without 
just compensation.” 41  Governments are therefore prohibited from 
“‘forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair-
ness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’”42 Thus, if 
the government physically appropriates or occupies private property, 
compensation is required.43
 A “taking” need not arise from an actual physical occupation of 
land by the government, however.44 The Supreme Court has held that 
“if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”45 Articulat-
ing a precise formula for determining when government regulation of 
private property amounts to a regulatory taking has proven to be an 
arduous task.46 In deªning “too far,” however, courts will consider three 
                                                                                                                      
38 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484 (1988) (holding that 
“under Mississippi law, the State’s ownership of [tidal waters] could not be lost”); In re 
Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 445 (noting the state constitution’s public trust lan-
guage); Paul Sarahan, Wetlands Protections Post-Lucas: Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine 
on Takings Analysis, 13 Va. Envtl. L.J. 537, 562 n.186 (1994) (explaining that states take 
varied approaches to protecting trust interests); see also Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54. 
39 See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892) (holding that, because 
of its duty as trustee, a state may revoke grants of land inconsistent with the public trust); 
McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003) (holding that, because 
of the public trust doctrine, a state agency denial of a permit was not a taking). 
40 Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54; see also supra notes 27–35 and accompanying text. 
41 U.S. Const. amend. V; Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 983–
84 (9th Cir. 2002). 
42 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (quoting 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
43 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (ªnding 
a taking where a cable television wire was placed on an apartment building). 
44 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). 
45 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J.). 
46 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 
771–72 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
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factors: (1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the regulation’s 
interference with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the 
character of the governmental action.47
 In addition, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme 
Court created a per se, “categorical” taking: if an “owner of real prop-
erty has been called upon to sacriªce all economically beneªcial uses in 
the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economi-
cally idle, he has suffered a taking.”48 Thus, where a regulation “denies 
all economically beneªcial or productive use of land,” the multi-factor 
test is not applied, and a compensable taking has occurred.49
 Justice Scalia and the majority in Lucas, however, established an 
important threshold inquiry to such a categorical taking.50 The Court 
explained: 
 Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives 
land of all economically beneªcial use, we think it may resist 
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into 
the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed 
use interests were not part of his title to begin with. 
 . . . . 
 . . . Any limitation [prohibiting all economically 
beneªcial use of the land] cannot be newly legislated or de-
creed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title 
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the 
State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land 
ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in 
other words, do no more than duplicate the result that could 
have been achieved in the courts—by adjacent landowners 
(or other uniquely affected persons) under the State’s law of 
private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary 
power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or 
otherwise.51
                                                                                                                      
47 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
48 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1019 (1992) (Scalia, J.); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 617 (2001). 
49 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 1019. Contra James S. Burling, Private Property Rights and the 
Environment After Palazzolo, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 33–34 (2002) (explaining that 
“clear statements in Lucas [illustrate] that property interests must ªrst be identiªed before 
a takings analysis is begun”). 
50 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027, 1029. 
51 See id. 
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 Thus, the Lucas majority held that there are two exceptions to the 
otherwise inºexible categorical regulatory takings rule.52 If the regu-
lation prevents a nuisance, or if the regulation is grounded in a state’s 
background principles of property law, the property owner need not 
be compensated.53 Although the Court provided two examples of a 
nuisance exception,54 it left the meaning of the “background princi-
ples of the State’s law of property” exception open to interpretation.55 
In order to fall under the background principles exception, a state 
must show “that the proscribed use interests were not part of [the 
claimant’s] title to begin with.”56  In other words, if a background 
principle of state property law “inhere[s] in the title itself,” a land-
owner never held full title to the property interest alleged to have 
been taken.57 After Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,58 background principles 
that serve as a defense to a regulatory taking may include: nuisance; 
common law doctrines like custom and the public trust; and, some 
argue, relatively recent legislative enactments.59
 The public trust doctrine is unmistakably implicated in both the 
categorical regulatory takings analysis and the Penn Central balancing 
test.60 In a categorical regulatory takings analysis, Lucas requires that 
background principles of state property law must be considered as a 
threshold issue.61 In addition, after Palazzolo and several state court 
decisions, any Penn Central balancing test must include consideration 
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. at 1015. 
53 See id. at 1027; see also Callies & Breemer, supra note 12, at 339–40. 
54 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029–30. In the ªrst example, the Court explained that an owner 
of a lakebed who is denied a permit to engage in a landªlling operation that would ºood 
others’ land would not be entitled to compensation. Id. at 1029. In the second, a govern-
ment would not be required to compensate an owner of a nuclear generating plant who is 
forced by regulation to remove his plant when the government learns his land sits on an 
earthquake fault. Id. at 1029–30. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at 1027, 1029. 
57 See id.; see also Dowling, supra note 12, at 76. 
58 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
59 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; Dowling, supra note 12, at 90–91 (maintaining that back-
ground principles are not limited to common law, but may include regulations that are a 
“reasonable extension” of nuisance and property law). The scope of background princi-
ples is the subject of much debate. See Callies & Breemer, supra note 12, at 340 (arguing 
that the principles can, “when subject to expansive interpretation, seriously erode the basic 
Lucas doctrine meant to provide compensation for regulatory takings that deprive an 
owner of all economically beneªcial use of land”). 
60 See infra Parts III, IV. 
61 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (“[W]e think [a state] may resist compensation only if the 
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed 
use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”). 
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of the public trust doctrine when public resources are at issue, as the 
doctrine may limit the economic impact of regulation or interfere 
with investment-backed expectations.62 Finally, courts must focus on 
whether a landowner in fact owned the property for which she seeks 
compensation;63 if a government’s action amounts to a physical occu-
pation or invasion of property, the public trust doctrine plays an im-
portant role in determining whether compensation is due.64
III. The Public Trust Doctrine and Categorical  
Regulatory Takings 
 When a regulation has deprived a landowner of all economically 
beneªcial use, Lucas provides that a threshold issue in determining 
whether compensation is due is whether the landowner’s rights of 
ownership are “conªned by limitations on the use of land which ‘in-
here in the title itself.’”65 Deªning what other than a nuisance consti-
tutes an inherent limitation which precludes compensation—which 
Lucas called “background principles”—requires the consideration of a 
range of background principle elements articulated in Lucas and 
other federal and state court decisions.66
                                                                                                                      
62 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Dick & 
Chandler, supra note 3, at 685–86 (explaining that background principles may be applied 
to the Penn Central balancing test); infra Part IV. 
63 See supra note 61. 
64 See Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 850–51, 852–53 (D. Wyo. 1994); 
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 320–24 (2001); see 
also infra Part V. 
65 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629 (2001) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1029). 
66 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–30; infra Part III.A. 
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A. Elements of a Background Principle 
 Several factors contribute to rendering a legal doctrine or law 67 a 
“background principle.”68 First, it must be a state, not federal, law or 
doctrine.69 Second, a doctrine or law “cannot be newly legislated or 
decreed.”70 That is, a limitation on property must be a “‘settled rule of 
law’”71 that is part of the “‘existing rules or understandings’” of state 
law.72 Third, in order to be considered a background principle, a re-
striction must “no more than duplicate the result that could have been 
achieved in the courts”;73 such a doctrine or law must be so implicit in 
state property law that, “at any point,” it is “open to the State” to make 
it explicit.74 Fourth, a doctrine or law is not a background principle if it 
applies to some landowners but not to others.75 Fifth, some courts may 
                                                                                                                      
67 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629–30. In addition to the background principles of prop-
erty and nuisance law, Palazzolo establishes that, in appropriate circumstances, statutes and 
regulations also constitute background principles. See id. In Palazzolo, the Court held that 
statutes are “transformed into a background principle of the State’s law by mere virtue of 
the passage of title,” but suggested that state statutes and regulations may be background 
principles of state law, particularly when they codify the common law. See id. Signiªcantly, 
Palazzolo’s description of background principles “in terms of those common, shared un-
derstandings of permissible limitations derived from a State’s legal tradition” may even 
mean that legislation extending common law beyond its traditional scope—so long as it is 
“derived from” common understandings—may be considered background principles. See 
id.; Dowling, supra note 12, at 67, 76–77, 90–91 (arguing that Lucas describes background 
principles as “embracing . . . the full range of property law” and Palazzolo “resolves any 
ambiguity by conªrming that background principles may include statutes, regulations, and 
the full range of common law doctrine in appropriate circumstances”); see also infra Part 
VI.B. 
68 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–30; infra Part III.A. For a cogent application of similar 
factors to the characterization of wildlife preservation as a background principle of law, see 
Houck, supra note 5, at 308–21. 
69 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (holding that a background principle must be of “the 
State’s law of property and nuisance”). 
70 See id. 
71 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 474 (1988) (quoting Knight v. 
United States Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891)). 
72 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 577 (1972)). 
73 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; see also Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 
113–15 (1999) (holding that, because a state water quality control statute which codiªed 
the public trust doctrine provided a background principle of state law, a denial of a mining 
permit “represented an exercise of regulatory authority indistinguishable in purpose and 
result from that to which plaintiff was always subject”). 
74 See Lucas, 505 at 1030; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001) 
(describing background principles as “those common, shared understandings of permissi-
ble limitations derived from a State’s legal tradition”). 
75 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630 (explaining that a “regulation or common-law rule 
cannot be a background principle for some owners but not for others”). 
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require that a doctrine or law’s application be relatively static.76 If the 
application of a doctrine or law greatly “vacillates”—and, because of 
ambiguous application, it appears that courts are creating a doctrine or 
law rather than describing it—it is less likely to be a background princi-
ple.77 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a limitation on property 
must “inhere in the title itself” in order to qualify as a background 
principle.78 As the Lucas Court explained, “the proscribed use interests 
[cannot be] part of [a landowner’s] title to begin with.”79
B. Why the Public Trust Doctrine Is a Background Principle 
 An examination of the public trust doctrine in light of the factors 
that render a law or legal doctrine a “background principle” reveals 
that the public trust doctrine can, and should, be characterized as a 
background principle.80
 First, the public trust doctrine is a state law doctrine.81 The Su-
preme Court’s earliest recognition of state dominion over public trust 
resources was in 1894 in Shively v. Bowlby: 
 At common law, the title and the dominion in lands 
ºowed by the tide were in the King for the beneªt of the na-
tion. . . . Upon the American Revolution, these rights, 
charged with a like trust, were vested in the original States 
within their respective borders, subject to the rights surren-
dered by the Constitution to the United States.82
Since the states, and not the federal government, received ownership 
of public trust land upon entry into the Union, the public trust doc-
trine thus satisªes the ªrst requirement that a background principle 
must be a state law or doctrine.83
                                                                                                                      
76 See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 n.4 (1994) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari). 
77 See id. Justice Scalia argued that “vacillations on the scope of the doctrine of custom 
. . . . reinforce a sense that the court is creating the doctrine rather than describing it.” 
See id. Presumably, unpredictability of a doctrine limits its applicability as a background 
principle. See id.; see also Callies & Breemer, supra note 12, at 377–78. 
78 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–30. 
79 Id. 
80 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–30; Houck, supra note 5, at 308–21; infra notes 81–129 
and accompanying text. 
81 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473–77 (1988). 
82 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). 
83 See Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 476 (afªrming that “longstanding precedents which 
hold that the States, upon entry into the Union, received ownership of all lands under 
waters subject to the ebb and ºow of the tide”). 
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 Second, the public trust doctrine satisªes the Lucas requirement 
that background principles be settled rules of law.84 Although states 
may codify it, no state can legislate the public trust doctrine itself.85 
Indeed, public trust resources preceded statehood.86 States acquired 
public trust land and the accompanying responsibility to it upon their  
entry into the Union.87 The public trust doctrine thus constitutes a 
permanent duty impressed upon state governments to preserve trust 
land for the public.88
 Despite gradual changes in application of the public trust doc-
trine, the doctrine itself “cannot be newly legislated or decreed.”89 
Indeed, the scope of the public trust doctrine is subject to consider-
able debate.90 Many scholars acknowledge the public trust doctrine 
but maintain that the reach of the doctrine should be ªxed.91 They 
argue that sudden shifts in the doctrine’s application cannot inhere in 
a title because abrupt changes in the doctrine cannot be consistent 
with settled rules of state law.92 Critics of an evolving public trust doc-
trine are correct that sudden shifts in a doctrine argue against its 
characterization as a background principle.93 But it is inconsistent to 
recognize the public trust doctrine as a background principle on one 
hand and then limit its application to a “traditional scope” on the 
other.94 Controlled evolution is inherent in the very deªnition of the 
public trust doctrine; the fundamental purpose of the doctrine is to 
meet the public’s changing circumstances and needs.95 Just as what 
constitutes a nuisance has changed over time, so too has the public 
                                                                                                                      
84 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
85 See Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 473–74 (describing how the public trust doctrine 
was vested in each state upon admission into the United States). 
86 See id. 
87 See id.; see also Sarahan, supra note 38, at 559. 
88 See Babcock, supra note 4, at 891 (“Some courts have interpreted the doctrine as im-
posing an afªrmative obligation on states to preserve trust resources for the beneªt of the 
public.”); see also infra Part VI.B. 
89 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
90 See, e.g., Callies & Breemer, supra note 12, at 361, 372–75 (arguing that the public 
trust should be restricted to tidal water and underlying lands). 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See id.; see also Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 n.4 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
94 See Callies & Breemer, supra note 12, at 361, 372–75; see also Borough of Neptune 
City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972). 
95 See Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54; see also Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 
1971) (holding that the public trust doctrine is “sufªciently ºexible to encompass chang-
ing public needs”). 
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trust doctrine slowly been “molded and extended” to satisfy the needs 
“of the public it was created to beneªt.”96 Careful, predictable expan-
sions of the doctrine, therefore, are not novel legislative decrees, but 
constitute a ªrmly embedded exercise of state duty.97
 Consequently, the public trust doctrine is a “‘settled rule of 
law.’” 98  Although the reach of the doctrine is disputed, American 
courts have always recognized that certain resources are preserved for 
the public, even if the jus privatum may be granted to private land-
owners.99 As a “‘settled rule of law,’”100 the public trust doctrine is 
therefore part of the “‘existing rules or understandings’”101 of Ameri-
can property law that comprise “background principles.” 102  A gov-
ernment cannot newly decree that which already exists as axiom.103
 Third, any exercise of the public trust doctrine’s inherent re-
straint on private actions that jeopardize public trust resources—for 
example, as a defense to a regulatory taking—“no more than dupli-
cate[s] the result that could have been achieved in the courts.”104 In-
deed, litigants frequently have invoked the public trust doctrine as a 
cause of action or afªrmative defense and prevailed.105 Put another 
way, a background principle must be implicit in state property law 
                                                                                                                      
96 Neptune City, 294 A.2d. at 54. 
97 See id. 
98 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 474 (1988) (quoting Knight v. 
United States Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891)). The Phillips Petroleum Court quoted at 
length from Knight, which states: 
 It is the settled rule of law in this court that absolute property in, and do-
minion and sovereignty over, the soils under the tide waters in the original 
States were reserved to the several States, and that the new States since admit-
ted have the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction in that behalf as the 
original States possess within their respective borders. 
Knight, 142 U.S. at 183. 
99 See supra Part I. 
100 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 474 (quoting Knight, 142 U.S. at 183). 
101 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (quoting Bd. of Regents 
of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 
102 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029–30. 
103 See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
104 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
105 See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842) (ªnding for a state in a 
land ownership case because it succeeded in the ownership of a common ªshery as a result 
of the public trust doctrine); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821) (ªnding for a state be-
cause it could not alienate to a private owner exclusive access to oyster beds); see also Sara-
han, supra note 38, at 568–72 (discussing Florida and Wisconsin as examples of states with 
legislatures using the public trust doctrine to protect critical wetlands and their surround-
ing natural environment). 
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such that, “at any point,” it is “open to the State” to make it explicit.106 
The public trust doctrine exempliªes an implicit limitation on prop-
erty that a state may make explicit.107 When the Rhode Island General 
Assembly enacted the Coastal Resource Management Act in 1971—the 
regulation at issue in Palazzolo—it was the culmination of over two 
hundred years of limitations on private interests in tidal waters. 108  
Since state law had traditionally acknowledged public use rights, “it 
was open to the legislature to make explicit what had formerly been 
implicit, and to restrict uses that had formerly been liberally permit-
ted but which, due to changing circumstances and new knowledge, it 
had become necessary to prohibit.”109 Because the public trust doc-
trine has always recognized public rights in trust resources—and has 
historically provided a legal hook for litigants suing on behalf of the 
public—the doctrine satisªes the duplication of legal results require-
ment for background principles.110
 Fourth, the public trust doctrine applies to all landowners 
equally.111 The Court in Palazzolo was concerned with labeling a regu-
lation as a background principle after its enactment because subse-
quent owners would be burdened by the newly recognized principle 
while prior owners would not similarly be burdened.112 “[A] regula-
tion that otherwise would be unconstitutional absent compensation,” 
the Court explained, “is not transformed into a background principle 
of the State’s law by mere virtue of the passage of title,” because the 
regulation’s application would cease to be equally shared.113 The pub-
lic trust doctrine steers clear of the Palazzolo Court’s concern.114 Any 
owner of the jus privatum interest of trust resources is limited by the 
public’s interest; even though private owners may hold title to trust 
resources, they hold their title subservient to the trustee-government’s 
right to act on behalf of the beneªciary-public.115 Because the public 
trust doctrine has always encumbered all landowners equally, it meets 
                                                                                                                      
106 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. 
107 See id. 
108 See Patrick A. Parenteau, Unreasonable Expectations: Why Palazzolo Has No Right to 
Turn a Silk Purse into a Sow’s Ear, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 101, 117 (2002). 
109 Id. 
110 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029–30. 
111 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001). 
112 See id. 
113 See id. at 629–30. 
114 See id. 
115 See Sarahan, supra note 38, at 557; supra Part I. 
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the Palazzolo requirement that regulations cannot be background 
principles for some owners but not for others.116
 Fifth, the public trust doctrine is a background principle because 
it does not “vacillate.”117 Justice Scalia and several commentators have 
argued that the doctrine of custom should not be considered a back-
ground principle because the doctrine’s boundaries ºuctuate.118 Dis-
senting from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City 
of Cannon Beach, Justice Scalia argued that the Oregon Supreme Court 
should not have accepted custom as a background principle because 
such “vacillations on the scope of the doctrine of custom . . . . rein-
force a sense that the court is creating the doctrine rather than de-
scribing it.”119 In contrast with Justice Scalia’s objection to “vacilla-
tions on the scope” of custom, concerns about pendulum-like 
interpretations of the public trust doctrine are unlikely given courts’ 
historically predictable application of the doctrine.120
 Changes in the public trust doctrine have been unambiguous, 
moving in one direction toward a broader scope.121 The predictable 
expansion of the doctrine from tidal waters to wetlands, beach access, 
and forests is widely acknowledged.122 Rarely, if ever, will courts limit 
the scope of the doctrine; rather, courts have gradually recognized 
that the public trust doctrine plays a larger role in protecting public 
trust resources.123 Moreover, a gradual expansion of the doctrine by 
state legislatures and courts merely reºects the doctrine’s original 
scope as preserving a broad range of natural resources for the pub-
                                                                                                                      
116 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630; Sarahan, supra note 38, at 557. 
117 See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 n.4 (1994) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari); see also Callies & Breemer, supra note 12, at 377–78; su-
pra note 77 and accompanying text. 
118 See Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1212 n.4; Callies & Breemer, supra note 12, at 377–78. 
119 See Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1212 n.4. 
120 See id.; see also supra Part I; infra notes 121–25 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra notes 26–40 and accompanying text; see also Michael C. Blumm & Thea 
Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 701, 707 
(1995) (describing the expanding scope of the public trust doctrine); Paul R. Williams & 
Stephen J. McHugh, Water Marketing and Instream Flows: The Next Step in Protecting Califor-
nia’s Instream Values, 9 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 132, 150–56 (1990) (explaining judicial expansion 
of the scope of the public trust doctrine); Johanna Searle, Note, Private Property Rights Yield 
to the Environmental Crisis: Perspectives on the Public Trust Doctrine, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 897, 909–10 
(1990) (discussing how the “public trust doctrine has been expanded to accommodate a 
broad range of environmental concerns”). 
122 See supra note 121; supra notes 26–40 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra note 121; supra notes 26–40 and accompanying text. 
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lic.124 Because the scope of the public trust doctrine does not vacil-
late—courts describe the public trust doctrine rather than create it— 
it qualiªes as a background principle.125
 For these reasons, the public trust doctrine comports with the ba-
sic Lucas characterization of background principles as restrictions that 
“proscribe[] use interests [that] were not part of [a landowner’s] title 
to begin with.”126 Because property interests in trust land are derived 
from settled, predictable state law that “no more than duplicate[s] the 
result that could have been achieved in the courts”127 and the public 
trust doctrine has not been “newly legislated or decreed,”128 the doc-
trine is a background principle that “inhere[s] in the title itself.”129
C. Instances in Which the Public Trust Doctrine Has Been Considered a 
Background Principle 
 At least two courts in categorical regulatory takings cases have 
considered the factors enumerated above and held that the public 
trust doctrine qualiªes as a background principle of state property 
law.130 Many others have strongly implied that the public trust doc-
trine is a background principle.131 The takings analysis in each case is 
informed by the Lucas threshold exception: if, because of the public 
                                                                                                                      
124 See supra note 121; supra notes 26–40 and accompanying text. Because the original 
expression of the public trust doctrine was so broad—encompassing the “‘air, running 
water, and [the] sea’”—regulatory decisions codifying the doctrine in less expansive terms 
can hardly be characterized as drifting from the doctrine’s “historical moorings.” See Nat’l 
Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983) (quoting 
J. Inst. 2.1.1). Contra Callies & Breemer, supra note 12, at 373. 
125 But see Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 n.4 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Callies & Breemer, supra note 12, at 377–78. 
126 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
127 Id. at 1029. 
128 Id. 
129 See id. at 1027–30. Even those critical of the public trust doctrine’s application to a 
takings analysis agree that the doctrine is a background principle. See Callies & Breemer, 
supra note 12, at 361 (“With respect to traditional public trust and custom, there is much 
to be said in favor of their apparent status as ‘background principles.’”). 
130 See Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002); 
McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119–20 (S.C. 2003); see also Daniel A. 
Nussbaum, McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Presenting the Question of the Rele-
vance of the Public Trust Doctrine to the Total Regulatory Takings Analysis, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 509, 
519 (2002). 
131 See, e.g., Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 113–14, 115 (1999); In re 
Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 494 (Haw. 2000). 
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trust doctrine, a limitation “inhere[s] in the title itself,” the land-
owner never held full title to the land in the ªrst place.132
 The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Es-
planade Properties, LLC v. City of Seattle is an unambiguous recognition 
of the public trust doctrine as a background principle.133 In Esplanade, 
a development company sued the city of Seattle after the city denied 
the company’s application to develop shoreline property.134 The court 
ªrst found that the city’s denial of the company’s development permit 
was a deprivation of all beneªcial uses of the company’s property.135 It 
then considered whether the public trust doctrine was a background 
principle of Washington state law.136 The Ninth Circuit noted that the 
doctrine was a settled rule of state law, declaring that “[i]t is beyond 
cavil that ‘a public trust doctrine has always existed in Washing-
ton.’”137 Explaining that the public trust doctrine is partially captured 
in the state constitution and reºected in the state’s Shoreline Man-
agement Act, the court underscored how Washington had substan-
tially made the public trust doctrine explicit.138 It thus suggested that 
the city’s denial based on the public trust doctrine was well supported 
by precedent, and only duplicated what could have been achieved in 
state courts via the state constitution, statute, or common law.139
 Finally, the court turned to the proposed development’s interfer-
ence with public recreation and, therefore, the issue of whether the 
company’s use interests were part of the company’s title to begin 
with.140 Since the development company’s shoreline property was lo-
cated near a public park, the court found that the company’s proposal 
to construct concrete pilings, driveways, and houses would have inter-
fered with public uses.141 “Esplanade’s development plans,” the Ninth 
Circuit concluded, “never constituted a legally permissible use.” 142  
Since the public trust doctrine was a background principle, the sec-
                                                                                                                      
132 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992); Esplanade Props., 307 
F.3d at 985; Rith Energy, 44 Fed. Cl. at 113–14, 115; R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 
781, 787 (Wis. 2001). 
133 307 F.3d at 985. 
134 Id. at 979–80. 
135 See id. at 985. 
136 Id. at 985–86. 
137 Id. at 985 (quoting Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (Wash. 1987)). 
138 See id. at 985–86. 
139 See Esplanade Props., 307 F.3d at 985–86. 
140 See id. at 987. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
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ond Lucas exception to categorical regulatory takings was met,143 and 
the “takings doctrine [did] not supply plaintiff with such a right to 
indemniªcation.”144
 Esplanade is also remarkable for its reading of Lucas with respect 
to the public trust doctrine.145 Quoting at length from the Lucas dis-
cussion of background principles, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Lu-
cas “effectively recognized the public trust doctrine.”146  Therefore, 
not only does Esplanade stand for the proposition that the public trust 
doctrine is a background principle of state law, but it also strongly 
suggests that courts may interpret Lucas as a tacit recognition of the 
public trust doctrine as a background principle.147
 Similarly, the Supreme Court of South Carolina recognized the 
public trust doctrine as a background principle of state law. 148  In 
McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, a landowner purchased two 
lots located adjacent to manmade saltwater canals in the 1960s.149 He 
did not make any improvements to the lots, and by 1991 when the 
landowner ªled an application to build bulkheads on his lots, the ma-
jority of both lots had reverted to tidelands or critical saltwater wet-
lands.150 The South Carolina Coastal Council denied the landowner a 
permit to develop the lots.151 The landowner then alleged a taking.152
                                                                                                                      
143 See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text. 
144 See Esplanade Props., 307 F.3d at 987. 
145 See id. at 986–87. 
146 See id. The Ninth Circuit is not alone in its reading of Lucas. See Virginia S. Albrecht 
& Deidre G. Duncan, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Navigational Servitude as “Background 
Principles,” in Inverse Condemnation and Related Government Liability 403, 405 
(A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, May 3, 2001), available in Westlaw, SF64 ALI-ABA 403; 
Dowling, supra note 12, at 76–77; Nussbaum, supra note 130, at 520. Many commentators 
have argued that Lucas itself suggests that the public trust doctrine is a background princi-
ple that prevents the government from being required to compensate a landowner for a 
categorical regulatory taking. Albrecht & Duncan, supra, at 405; Dowling, supra note 12, at 
76–77; Nussbaum, supra note 130, at 520. First, the language the Lucas court employs in its 
summary of a “‘total taking’ inquiry”—that “the degree of harm to public lands and re-
sources . . . posed by the claimant’s proposed activities” is required in any categorical 
analysis—strongly implicates the public trust doctrine. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). Second, in addition to explicitly listing nuisance law, Lucas 
discusses background principles as encompassing the full range of property law. See id. at 
1029. Third, the Court notes the navigational servitude—a non-nuisance doctrine that is 
the federal expression of the public trust doctrine—in proffering examples of background 
principles that defeat a regulatory taking. See id. at 1028–29. 
147 See Esplanade Props., 307 F.3d at 986–87. 
148 See McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119–20 (S.C. 2003). 
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 Like in Esplanade, the South Carolina Supreme Court ªrst held 
that the landowner’s lots retained no value and, therefore, that there 
had been a total deprivation of all economically beneªcial use.153 The 
court then focused on whether background principles of state prop-
erty law absolved the state from an obligation to compensate the 
landowner.154 It examined the public trust doctrine, ªnding that the 
state “has a long line of cases regarding the public trust doctrine,” and 
noting that as early as 1884 the court recognized the state’s role as 
trustee of jus privatum and jus publicum land. 155  The court further 
stated that the state holds “presumptive title” to public trust land.156 
After its suggestion that the public trust doctrine in South Carolina 
meets the requirements of a background principle157—because it is 
not newly legislated but is a settled rule of state law, and the Council’s 
decision merely duplicates that which could have been achieved in 
the courts158—the court concluded that the reversion to tidelands “ef-
fected a restriction on [the landowner’s] property rights inherent in 
the ownership of property bordering tidal water.” 159  Because the 
landowner’s lots were “public trust property subject to control of the 
State,” it was unnecessary for the state to “compensate [the land-
owner] for the denial of permits to do what he cannot otherwise 
do.”160 The court’s citation of Esplanade—the only case to explicitly 
include the public trust doctrine as a background principle—in sup-
port of its conclusion reveals the court’s strong afªrmation of the doc-
trine as a background principle of South Carolina property law.161
 In addition to the recognition by Esplanade and McQueen that the 
public trust doctrine is a background principle,162 numerous courts 
have strongly indicated that background principles include the public 
trust doctrine.163 Although never expressly describing the public trust 
doctrine as a background principle, in In re Water Use Permit Applica-
                                                                                                                      
153 See Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002); 
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119. 
154 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 See id. at 119–20. 
158 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
159 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 120. 
160 Id. 
161 See id. 
162 Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002); McQueen, 
580 S.E.2d at 119–20. 
163 See, e.g., Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 113–14 (1999); In re Wa-
ter Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 494 (Haw. 2000). 
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tions, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the doctrine defeated a 
regulatory takings objection because the “original limitation of the 
public trust defeats [the plaintiff’s] claims of absolute entitlement.”164 
In In re Water Use Permit Applications, private citizens sued the state wa-
ter commission because a public trust-based water regime prohibited 
them from using groundwater that had at one time been considered 
private property.165 The court looked to the Hawaii state constitution, 
which enshrines the public trust doctrine. 166  Recognizing that the 
public trust doctrine has been ªrmly embedded as a settled law since 
the state’s inception, the court held: “[T]he people of this state have 
elevated the public trust doctrine to the level of a constitutional man-
date. . . . We therefore hold that [the constitution] adopt[s] the 
public trust doctrine as a fundamental principle of constitutional law 
in Hawai’i.”167 The court further noted the fact that the public trust 
doctrine was a state property law doctrine that the legislature had 
merely made explicit: 
[T]he reserved sovereign prerogatives over the waters of the 
state precludes the assertion of vested rights to water con-
trary to public trust purposes. This restriction preceded the 
formation of property rights in this jurisdiction; in other 
words, the right to absolute ownership of water exclusive of 
the public trust never accompanied the “bundle of rights” 
conferred in the MChele.168
The Hawaii Supreme Court’s analysis of the public trust doctrine as a 
predictable, settled rule of state law that has not been newly legislated 
                                                                                                                      
164 9 P.3d at 494. The majority so held in an 80-page opinion that required a half-page 
just for its table of contents. Id. at 421. 
165 See id. at 422–23, 426. 
166 Haw. Const. art. XI, § 1 (“All public natural resources are held in trust by the 
State for the beneªt of the people.”). 
167 In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 443–44. 
168 See id. at 494. In the 1840s, Hawaii’s King Kamehameha III determined that a land 
“mahele,” or division, was an important step toward modernizing the traditional system of 
land tenure. See State v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 730 (Haw. 1977). The Great Mahele of 1848 
provided that the King would retain all his private lands as individual property and that, of 
the remaining lands, one-third was to be set aside for the Government, one-third to the 
chiefs, and one-third for the tenants. See id. For a fascinating historical analysis of the Great 
Mahele of 1848, see the Hawaii Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Zimring, 566 P.2d at 
729–31. 
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essentially afªrmed the doctrine as a background principle that in-
heres in the title of public trust land itself.169
 Further, in Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, the U.S. Court of Fed-
eral Claims held that a statute codifying the public trust doctrine was 
a background principle and, therefore, the statute served as a defense 
to a categorical regulatory taking.170 In Rith Energy, a holder of leases 
to a surface coal mine alleged a regulatory taking after the federal 
government rejected a proposed mining plan due to the plan’s poten-
tial adverse effects on soil.171 The court ªrst described how the Ten-
nessee Water Quality Control Act of 1977 codiªed the public trust 
doctrine.172 It then considered whether this codiªcation of the public 
trust doctrine was a background principle of state law.173 The court 
held that it was.174 Focusing on the background principle element 
that a restriction may no more than duplicate a result that could have 
been achieved in the courts, the court held that the permit denial 
“represented an exercise of regulatory authority indistinguishable in 
purpose and result from that to which plaintiff was always subject un-
der Tennessee nuisance law.” 175  In recognizing the Act as a back-
ground principle, the court effectively held that the public trust doc-
trine is a background principle of Tennessee property law.176
D. Instances in Which the Public Trust Doctrine Has Not Been Considered a 
Background Principle 
 In certain, fact-speciªc circumstances, courts have held that the 
public trust doctrine does not qualify as a background principle that 
may be used as a defense to a regulatory takings claim.177 It appears 
that there are two exceptions to the general rule that the doctrine is a 
background principle which precludes a taking: (1) when a well set-
                                                                                                                      
169 See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 443–44; Callies & Breemer, supra note 
12, at 358. 
170 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 113–14, 115 (1999). 
171 Id. at 110–12; Nussbaum, supra note 130, at 519. 
172 Rith Energy, 44 Fed. Cl. at 114 (holding that the Act “recognizes the waters of the 
state, including its groundwaters, as property of the state, held in public trust, and subject 
to a right of ‘the people of Tennessee, as beneªciaries of this trust . . . to unpolluted wa-
ters’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-3-102(a) (1998)). 
173 See id. at 113–14. 
174 Id. at 114. 
175 Id. at 115. 
176 See id. at 113–14, 115; Nussbaum, supra note 130, at 519–20. 
177 See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 324 
(2001); infra notes 179–93. 
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tled state regulation is directly contrary to the doctrine; and (2) when 
a regulation codifying the doctrine limits use of property beyond the 
doctrine’s widely accepted boundaries.178
 In Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, for exam-
ple, California water users claimed that federal water use restrictions 
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) effected a taking of their 
right to the use of water.179 Examining whether the public trust doc-
trine was a background principle of California state property law, the 
Tulare court ªrst emphasized that using or diverting water in an un-
reasonable manner violated the public trust.180 It then explained that 
the facts of the case with respect to the public trust doctrine as a 
background principle were unique because the prohibited water use 
had been speciªcally authorized in a century-old regime of private 
water rights.181 The ESA, which the government claimed had effec-
tively codiªed the state’s traditional public trust doctrine, would have 
provided a result precisely opposite from that which could have been 
achieved in the courts.182 Therefore, the doctrine’s alleged codiªca-
tion in the ESA was not the codiªcation of a background principle.183
 By deeming unreasonable a use that had once been considered 
reasonable, the court reasoned, “we would not be making explicit that 
which had always been implied under background principles of prop-
erty law, but would instead be replacing the state’s judgment with our 
own.”184 The Tulare court therefore afªrmed the notion that water use 
permits are subject to the public trust doctrine, but awarded compen-
satory damages because a statute had speciªcally replaced part of an 
entrenched regulatory regime.185
 Likewise, in Purdie v. Attorney General, the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire held that a regulation purporting to codify the public 
trust doctrine, but which was inconsistent with traditional understand-
ings of the doctrine, was not the codiªcation of a background princi-
                                                                                                                      
178 See Purdie v. Attorney General, 732 A.2d 442, 447 (N.H. 1999). 
179 Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 314. As noted below, the Tulare court concluded that the dep-
rivation of water amounted to a physical taking. Id. at 318–19; see infra Part V. Despite the 
fact that this section focuses on categorical regulatory takings, a discussion of Tulare is 
included here because of the court’s detailed analysis of whether the public trust doctrine 
in the speciªc circumstances qualiªed as a background principle. 
180 Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 324 (“There is, in the end, no dispute that . . . plaintiffs’ con-
tract rights, [were] subject to the doctrines of reasonable use and public trust . . . .”). 
181 See id. at 314, 321, 324. 
182 See id. at 323. 
183 See id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 323–24. 
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ple.186  There, beachfront property owners sued the state, claiming 
that a regulation deªning the public’s trust rights in coastal shore-
lands effected an unconstitutional taking.187 Because the “New Hamp-
shire common law limits public ownership of the shorelands to the 
mean high water mark,” the court concluded that “the legislature 
went beyond these common law limits by extending public trust rights 
to the highest high water mark.”188 Thus, because the property restric-
tion in this case was not implicit in state property law, the limitation 
was not a background principle.189
 Aside from the rare situations in which a statute codifying the 
public trust doctrine directly replaces traditional understandings of 
state property law, or a regulation suddenly broadens the scope of the 
doctrine beyond the public’s changing circumstances or needs, use 
restrictions consistent with the public trust doctrine “inhere in the 
title itself.”190 A codiªcation of the public trust doctrine, therefore, is 
the explicit recognition of a background principle.191 Thus, where the 
public trust doctrine limits landowner rights, a categorical regulatory 
takings inquiry ends.192 Because the threshold issue when a regulation 
totally deprives a landowner of all economically beneªcial use is 
whether a proscribed use was part of the owner’s title to begin with— 
and because the public trust doctrine encumbers land with limitations 
which “inhere in the title itself”—no compensation is due if a regula-
tion is a codiªcation of the public trust doctrine.193
IV. The Public Trust Doctrine and the Penn Central 
Balancing Test 
 When there has been no physical occupation or deprivation of all 
economic or beneªcial use, the public trust doctrine often plays a 
critical role in determining whether compensation is due.194 In cases 
where there has been no categorical taking, the public trust doctrine 
informs each factor of the ad-hoc, factual inquiry ªrst articulated in 
                                                                                                                      
186 See 732 A.2d 442, 447 (N.H. 1999). 
187 Id. at 444. 
188 Id. at 447. 
189 See id. 
190 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629 (2001); Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314, 323–24 (2001); Purdie, 732 A.2d at 447. 
191 See supra Part III.A–C. 
192 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629; supra Part III.A–C. 
193 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629; supra Part III.A–C. 
194 See infra notes 198–233 and accompanying text. 
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Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.195 Thus, in determining 
whether a regulation on land use goes “too far,”196 courts have fre-
quently considered the public trust doctrine in examining the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation, its interference with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental 
action.197
 In evaluating the public trust doctrine’s relationship to economic 
impact, courts generally focus on property rights that accompany a 
landowner’s title. 198  If the public trust doctrine encumbered the 
landowner’s title from the beginning, a regulation effectively has little 
or no economic impact.199 Similarly, courts examine the property in-
terests actually transferred to a landowner in considering the public 
trust doctrine’s effect on investment-backed expectations.200 If a land-
owner’s proposed use was never permissible because of the public 
trust doctrine, the court evaluates investment-backed expectations 
accordingly.201 Generally, this means that constructive knowledge of a 
state’s common law property restrictions is a critical factor in evaluat-
ing a landowner’s expectations.202 For this reason, as Patrick Parentau 
points out, “it is often difªcult to distinguish background principles 
from investment-backed expectations.” 203  Because a limitation on 
                                                                                                                      
195 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Dick 
& Chandler, supra note 3, at 685–86 (explaining that the public trust doctrine may be ap-
plied to the Penn Central balancing test). 
196 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J.). 
197 See infra notes 198–233 and accompanying text. 
198 See, e.g., Karam v. State, 705 A.2d 1221, 1226–29 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998); R.W. Docks 
& Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781, 790–91 (Wis. 2001). 
199 See Karam, 705 A.2d at 1226–29; R.W. Docks & Slips, 628 N.W.2d at 790–91. 
200 See Karam, 705 A.2d at 1228–29; R.W. Docks & Slips, 628 N.W.2d at 790–91. 
201 See Karam, 705 A.2d at 1228–29; R.W. Docks & Slips, 628 N.W.2d at 790–91. 
202 See Sarahan, supra note 38, at 572–73. Sarahan argues that a court considering a 
property owner’s expectations in a regulatory takings context should look at seven factors: 
(1) the historical character of the property and that of the relevant public 
trust lands at the time of the landowner’s purchase of the property; (2) the 
state of the property and that of the relevant public trust lands from the time 
of the landowner’s purchase through the time of the intended development; 
(3) the historic application of the state’s public trust doctrine; (4) the eco-
nomic and environmental value of the property; (5) the nature of the in-
tended development; (6) the scientiªc evidence supporting the restriction 
on development; and (7) the extent of damage likely to be caused by the de-
velopment, from both an individual and a cumulative perspective. 
Id. 
203 Parenteau, supra note 108, at 127. 
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property must “inhere in the title itself”204 in order to qualify as a 
background principle, and because an investment-backed expectation 
is handicapped by a landowner’s constructive knowledge of inhering 
restrictions on property use, the two are inextricably linked.205 Finally, 
in a Penn Central analysis, courts will weigh the beneªts of a regula-
tion’s impact on trust resources in evaluating the character of gov-
ernmental action.206 If a restriction protecting a trust resource pro-
vides a socially important function, the character of governmental 
action will weigh against compensation for a regulatory taking.207
 In R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
evaluated the denial by that state’s Department of Natural Resources 
(Department) of a marina developer’s dredging permit by examining 
how the public trust doctrine was implicated in the character of the 
Department’s action, its economic impact, and the degree to which it 
interfered with the developer’s investment-backed expectations. 208  
Turning ªrst to the character of the Department’s action, the court 
found that the Department “acted primarily to protect an emergent 
weedbed on behalf of the public.”209 The court then held that the 
“state . . . holds title to the lakebed, and therefore, to the extent that 
a private property interest is implicated here, it is riparian only and 
therefore qualiªed in nature, encumbered by the public trust doc-
trine.”210 The character of the governmental action in R.W. Docks & 
Slips—protecting an emergent weedbed held in trust for the public— 
“weighs against a ªnding that [the developer] has suffered a com-
pensable regulatory taking.”211
 The Wisconsin Supreme Court then considered the economic 
impact of the Department’s permit denial and the extent to which it 
interfered with the developer’s investment-backed expectations. 212  
The court began by explaining that its evaluation of both factors is 
“strongly inºuenced by the fact that the development of this private 
marina on the bed and waters of Lake Superior was encumbered by 
the public trust doctrine . . . from the get-go.”213 It then noted that 
                                                                                                                      
204 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
205 See Parenteau, supra note 108, at 127. 
206 See R.W. Docks & Slips, 628 N.W.2d at 790. 
207 See id. 
208 Id. at 790–91. 
209 Id. at 790. 
210 Id. 
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212 See R.W. Docks & Slips, 628 N.W.2d at 790–91. 
213 Id. at 790. 
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the developer never “possessed an unfettered ‘right’” to develop;214 
even though the developer’s plans were frustrated, “those plans were 
encumbered by the public trust doctrine and contingent upon the 
periodic issuance of [Department] permits from the beginning.”215 
Because the weedbed was encumbered by the public trust doctrine 
before the developer purchased it, the economic impact of the permit 
denial on the developer was minimized because he should have been 
on notice that his plans to develop would be limited by the doctrine 
“in the ªrst place.”216  Likewise, even though the developer’s plans 
may have been proscribed by the permit denial, his investment-
backed expectations should not have been disappointed, as the land 
was encumbered by the public trust doctrine “from the beginning.”217 
“Under the circumstances of this case,” the court concluded, “the 
[Department’s] action cannot be said to have ‘gone too far’ to cause 
the sort of negative economic impact or substantial interference with 
investment expectations as to amount to a regulatory taking.”218
 Similarly, in Karam v. State, the court examined whether New Jer-
sey’s denial of a development permit worked a taking of the riparian 
landowners’ property.219 In Karam, the court adopted a unique ap-
proach to the Penn Central balancing test.220 It explained that in order 
to evaluate the regulation’s economic impact and landowner’s in-
vestment-backed expectations, it must ªrst deªne what sticks made up 
the “bundle of rights” acquired by the owner.221 Turning ªrst to the 
economic impact of the permit denial, the court held that because 
the tidal land was burdened by use restrictions “in the name of the 
common good” when the land was conveyed to the landowner, the 
economic impact weighed against a taking.222
 Next, the court found that under the public trust doctrine, “own-
ership of and domain and sovereignty over lands covered by tide wa-
ters . . . belong to the respective states.”223 Moreover, it concluded 
that “the sovereign never waives its right to regulate the use of public 
                                                                                                                      
214 See id. 
215 Id. at 791. 
216 See id. at 790–91. 
217 See id. at 791. 
218 R.W. Docks & Slips, 628 N.W.2d at 791. 
219 705 A.2d 1221, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998). 
220 See id. at 1225–26. 
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222 See id. at 1226–27. 
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tion in original)). 
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trust property” 224  and, therefore, the state’s riparian grant to the 
landowners “did not create an absolute and perpetual right to” de-
velop property. 225  The landowner thus “‘had notice in advance of 
[his] investment decision that the governmental regulations . . . had 
been or would be enacted.’”226 Therefore, the permit denial did not 
destroy the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations.227
 Likewise, the Washington Supreme Court held that the public 
trust doctrine informed an inquiry into the reasonability of a devel-
oper’s investment-backed expectations. 228  In Orion Corp. v. State, the 
plaintiff purchased tideland acreage for the purpose of creating a resi-
dential community.229 Intending to dredge and ªll a bay for his resi-
dential community, the developer claimed a regulatory taking when the 
state passed a tideland law limiting the developer’s use of the tidal wet-
lands.230  The court held that the developer purchased his property 
“subject to the limitations imposed by the public trust.”231 Because the 
tidelands were held in public trust, the court found that the developer’s 
plans for a residential community never constituted a legally permissi-
ble use232 and, therefore, the regulation never interfered with the de-
veloper’s reasonable investment-backed expectations.233
V. The Public Trust Doctrine and Categorical  
Physical Takings 
 When a regulatory body’s action amounts to a physical occupa-
tion or invasion of property—when a categorical physical taking oc-
curs—the public trust doctrine may also play a role in determining 
whether compensation is due.234 If public trust resources are impli-
cated in a categorical physical taking, the analysis appears to mirror 
                                                                                                                      
224 See id. (citing Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453). 
225 See Karam, 705 A.2d at 1229. 
226 See id. at 1228 (quoting E. Cape May Assocs. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 693 A.2d 114, 
120 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (alteration in original)). 
227 See id. at 1228–29. 
228 See Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1086 (Wash. 1987). 
229 See id. at 1065. 
230 See id. at 1065–66, 1067. 
231 See id. at 1082. 
232 See id. at 1082–83. 
233 See id. at 1086; see also Dick & Chandler, supra note 3, at 693–94 (discussing the role 
of the public trust doctrine in the evaluation of investment-backed expectations in Orion). 
234 See Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 852–53 (D. Wyo. 1994) (discuss-
ing the public trust doctrine in the context of wildlife ownership); Tulare Lake Basin Wa-
ter Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 320, 324 (2001); Caspersen, supra note 
27, at 381–87. 
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the categorical regulatory takings analysis. 235  That is, after having 
concluded that a regulatory body’s action amounts to a physical tak-
ing, courts will determine whether a landowner in fact owned the 
property for which she seeks compensation.236
 Thus, at least one court has examined the extent to which physical 
appropriation merely reºects limitations of title inherent in back-
ground principles of state law.237 In Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dis-
trict v. United States,238 the U.S. Court of Federal Claims explained that, 
“[h]aving concluded that a deprivation of water amounts to a physical 
taking, we turn now to the question of whether plaintiffs in fact owned 
the property for which they seek to be compensated.”239 Examining the 
“background principles of state law” that may have “limit[ed] the scope 
of [the] plaintiffs’ property right,” the Tulare court extensively dis-
cussed the public trust doctrine.240 Although it ultimately determined 
that a codiªcation of the public trust doctrine was not the codiªcation 
of a background principle,241 the court’s analysis lucidly illustrates the 
potential impact of the public trust doctrine on a physical takings 
claim.242 Like in a categorical regulatory analysis, the public trust doc-
trine serves as a background principle and, therefore, courts must con-
sider the doctrine’s applicability when a landowner claims that a regula-
tory body’s action amounts to a physical occupation or invasion.243
 The public trust doctrine may play a particularly important role 
in the context of wildlife damage to private property.244 In the wake of 
reintroduction programs and other wildlife protection initiatives, 
landowners have brought a variety of physical takings claims.245 How-
                                                                                                                      
235 See Clajon Prod., 854 F. Supp. at 852–53; Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 320, 324; see also supra 
Part III. 
236 See Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 320. 
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238 See supra notes 179–85 and accompanying text (discussing takings claim in Tulare). 
239 Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 320 (citing Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 
1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). The Tulare court described Palm Beach Isles as “deªning the 
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240 Id. at 320, 320–24. 
241 See id.; supra notes 179–85. 
242 Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 320, 321–24. 
243 See id.; see also supra Part III. 
244 See Caspersen, supra note 27, at 385–87. 
245 See id.; see also Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1334 (9th Cir. 1988) (challenging a 
bear protection statute); Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 847 (D. Wyo. 
1994) (challenging a hunting regulation). 
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ever, because wildlife is a trust resource,246 the presence of wild ani-
mals on private land cannot effect a physical taking.247 First, private 
landowners have never owned wildlife on their property because wild-
life is “a sort of common property.”248 Thus, a landowner is not de-
prived of a property interest when she is prohibited from killing wild-
life.249 Second, the presence of wildlife on private land does not effect 
a taking because wildlife has always enjoyed a natural right to inhabit 
the land.250 Unlike the cable wire in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp.,251 the public trust doctrine provides wildlife with an over-
riding right to occupy private land, particularly when its presence is 
the result of a rehabilitation effort.252
 In Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera, for example, a federal court in 
Wyoming applied the public trust doctrine to a claim that a state hunt-
ing regulation was a physical taking of property.253 The landowners in 
Clajon argued that both the wild animals’ presence on their property, as 
well as the animals’ consumption of the forage on their property, con-
stituted a physical taking.254 The court reasoned that the success of the 
landowners’ claim turned on the ownership of the animals.255 It dis-
cussed a Tenth Circuit case, Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 
                                                                                                                      
246 See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1896) (holding that wild ani-
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U.S. at 427. 
252 See Caspersen, supra note 27, at 387. 
253 See 854 F. Supp. at 847, 850–51, 852–53. 
254 See id. at 852. 
255 See id. 
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noting in particular the Tenth Circuit’s holding that wild animals are 
“‘common property whose control and regulation are to be exercised 
as a trust for the beneªt of the people.’”256 Finding that “wild animals 
are owned, in the proprietary sense, by no one,” the Clajon court held 
that there was no physical invasion attributable to the state.257
VI. Lessons from the Application of the Public Trust  
Doctrine to Modern Takings Analysis 
 Recognizing that the public trust doctrine underlies a modern 
takings analysis provides several salient lessons about buying and sell-
ing property, regulatory strategy, and a community-based approach to 
conceptualizing property rights. 
A. Buyers and Sellers of Property Should Be Informed About  
Applicable Background Principles 
 Not only is the traditionally recognized knowledge of a parcel’s 
metes and bounds vital to property ownership, but a takings analysis 
cognizant of the public trust doctrine reveals that landowners must 
also be informed about ªrmly embedded understandings of state 
property law.258 Purchasing land without full knowledge of a state’s 
background principles places landowners in a precarious situation.259 
Despite possession of a deed, landowners may not actually hold full 
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property was not a taking and held that, because of the government’s ªduciary duty to 
protect wildlife as a trust resource, no compensation was due. Id. at 1428–29, 1431. 
257 See Clajon Prod., 854 F. Supp. at 853; see also Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 
1917) (ªnding that a law reintroducing beavers was not a regulatory taking despite dam-
age to valuable woodland property because the state had acted in its ªduciary capacity as 
trustee “for the beneªt of the public”); cf. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1334 (9th Cir. 
1988) (holding that a statute protecting bears was not a physical taking because bears were 
not “governmental agents”). 
258 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027, 1029; Karam v. State, 705 
A.2d 1221, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that “plaintiffs must be held to have had 
constructive knowledge” of recent environmental protection regulation); Sarahan, supra 
note 38, at 564 (arguing that noncompensation in public trust cases “is equitable given 
that the owner purchased the property with, at least, constructive knowledge of the state’s 
interpretation of the public trust doctrine”). 
259 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027, 1029; see also supra Part III.A–C (discussing instances in 
which landowners did not prevail on takings claim because of the public trust doctrine); 
supra Parts IV, V. 
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title; if the deed is to land encumbered by the public trust doctrine, 
for example, landowners can merely claim title to the jus privatum.260 
Moreover, lack of knowledge about property use rights that results in 
unfounded development expectations may dash the most grandiose 
development plans.261 Regardless of what property use a landowner 
anticipates enjoying, courts read long-established, predictable state 
property law principles—like the public trust doctrine—into a title.262 
The government will prevail on any regulatory or physical takings 
claim in such a case, in spite of what a landowner thought she owned, 
and irrespective of her plans to develop it.263
 Further, buyers and sellers of land and their attorneys should be 
intimately familiar with what a state may potentially consider to be a 
background principle of its property law, and how such a principle 
might restrict a landowner’s title.264 Such familiarity is critical in two 
contexts. First, landowners must be aware of changes in their land 
that may implicate a background principle that was not previously at 
issue. 265  The South Carolina Supreme Court’s poignant words in 
McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council serve as a strong incentive for 
prospective and current landowners to be informed about natural 
transformation of land that might invite application of the public 
trust doctrine: “Any taking McQueen suffered is not a taking effected 
by State regulation but by the forces of nature and McQueen’s own 
lack of vigilance in protecting his property.”266
 Second, landowners should be aware of changes in legislation 
that may implicate a background principle that, at the time of pur-
chase, may not have been a background principle.267 An informed 
owner of land should keep abreast of environmental trends, and be 
                                                                                                                      
260 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027, 1029–30; supra Parts I, III.A–C. 
261 See, e.g., Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(afªrming a denial of an application to construct driveways and houses in a navigable tide-
lands area); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1066, 1089 (Wash. 1987) (holding that a 
state law precluding developer from constructing Venetian-style residential community was 
not a taking). 
262 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027, 1029–30. 
263 See Sarahan, supra note 38, at 564; supra Parts III, IV, V. 
264 See supra notes 258–63 and accompanying text. 
265 See McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003) (holding that 
“reversion to tidelands effected a restriction on [landowner’s] property rights inherent in 
the ownership of property bordering tidal water”). 
266 Id.; see also Nussbaum, supra note 130, at 522–24 (explaining that, at least for land 
adjacent to tidelands, landowners have “at a minimum, constructive knowledge of both the 
public trust doctrine and the ‘water’s inherent tendency to change its borders’” (quoting 
Sarahan, supra note 38, at 564). 
267 See Karam v. State, 705 A.2d 1221, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998). 
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wary of land that is or may be slated for environmental protection.268 
At least one court has found that developers are responsible for 
awareness of the “regulatory climate” and, therefore, should be held 
accountable for failing to anticipate reasonably foreseeable legisla-
tion.269 Another, in Karam v. State, forcefully articulated the responsi-
bility placed on landowners to keep abreast of broad policy change: 
 The crucial fact is that since the early 1970’s the regula-
tory jurisdiction . . . has substantially expanded . . . . The 
decision to shift public policy from commerce to environ-
mental protection and wildlife preservation was not made by 
a faceless bureaucrat somewhere within the administrative 
labyrinth of a nameless ofªce building in Trenton. Instead, it 
was articulated by our Legislature in carefully crafted enact-
ments and heralded by the Governor with great fanfare. 
Plaintiffs must be held to have had constructive notice of 
these developments.270
 Both before and after purchase, therefore, the public trust doc-
trine’s application to takings should strongly encourage landowners 
to ensure that what courts will consider constructive knowledge is 
their actual knowledge.271 Ignorance of background principles in a 
takings context is indeed no excuse.272
B. State and Local Regulatory Bodies Should Strategically Employ the Public 
Trust Doctrine in Environmental Protection Regulation 
 Recognizing that the public trust doctrine underlies a modern 
takings analysis reveals certain duties and responsibilities required of 
state and local regulatory bodies, but, perhaps more importantly, also 
illustrates that such regulatory bodies are afforded an impregnable 
environmental protection technique.273
 That a takings analysis is informed by the public trust doctrine 
underscores the fact that state regulatory bodies are required to pro-
                                                                                                                      
268 See id.; see also Sarahan, supra note 38, at 565–66 (explaining that the “symbiotic re-
lationship” between wetlands and other waters is becoming increasingly understood). 
269 See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361–63 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
landowner could not have been “oblivious” to “rising environmental awareness [that] 
translated into ever-tightening land use regulations”); Karam, 705 A.2d at 1229. 
270 705 A.2d at 1229. 
271 See Sarahan, supra note 38, at 564. 
272 See id.. 
273 See infra notes 274–86 and accompanying text. 
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tect certain resources. 274  Because states act as trustees for the 
beneªciary public, they must fulªll their ªduciary duties by acting on 
behalf of the public when trust resources are jeopardized.275 In turn, 
courts must permit regulatory bodies to take action—by passing laws, 
enforcing existing environmental regulations, or denying develop-
ment permits—to protect trust resources.276 A takings claim against a 
regulatory body using its legislative muscle to act as trustee of public 
resources should therefore fail.277
 Thus, in drafting legislation that formally restricts the use of land 
for environmental protection reasons, state and local regulatory bod-
ies should state that such restrictions are an explicit declaration of the 
public trust doctrine.278 In this way, regulatory bodies can clearly con-
                                                                                                                      
274 See In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (“Under the public 
trust doctrine, the State . . . and the United States have the right and the duty to protect 
and preserve the public’s interest in natural wildlife resources. Such right does not derive 
from ownership of the resources but from a duty owing to the people.”); State v. Jersey 
Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (“The State 
has not only the right but also the afªrmative ªduciary obligation to ensure that the rights 
of the public to a viable marine environment are protected . . . .”); Orion Corp. v. State, 
747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (Wash. 1987) (holding that the “public trust doctrine emanates from 
this public authority interest, which requires the state to maintain its dominion in trust for 
the people”). 
275 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
276 See id.; see also Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 
2002); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119–20 (S.C. 2003). 
277 See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453; Esplanade Props., 307 F.3d at 985; McQueen, 580 
S.E.2d at 119–20. While the doctrine’s application to the takings analysis illustrates certain 
limits on owners of property, its relationship to a modern takings analysis also demon-
strates legislative limitations. See Dick & Chandler, supra note 3, at 691. First, where the 
public trust doctrine inheres in the title of a parcel of land, the parcel cannot be fully 
owned by a private citizen, but it cannot be owned by a government either. See supra Part I. 
Second, as trustee, states are restricted in their ability to alienate trust land. See Ill. Cent. 
R.R., 146 U.S. at 453. Although a state may transfer the jus privitum of trust land, trust land 
is continually encumbered by the requirement that it be used to beneªt the public. See 
Dick & Chandler, supra note 3, at 691. For instance, in In re Water Use Permit Applications, 
the Hawaii Supreme Court prohibited a state agency decision from derogating the public 
trust, holding that its state water commission was bound by an “‘afªrmative duty to take the 
public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect 
public trust uses whenever feasible.’” 9 P.3d 409, 453 (Haw. 2000) (quoting Nat’l Audubon 
Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983)). Resources held 
in trust are held for the beneªt of the present and future public—not for the beneªt of a 
current governmental body—and therefore a government cannot alienate or derogate any 
parcel of land encumbered by the public trust doctrine. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453. 
278 See supra notes 273–77 and accompanying text. In Hawaii, for example, a presump-
tion in favor of public use and enjoyment is explicitly written into the state constitution, 
mandating the state to promote and utilize trust resources “in a manner consistent with 
their conservation.” See Haw. Const. art. XI, § 1. 
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vey that they intend to “make the implication of . . . background 
principles of nuisance and property law explicit.”279
 Moreover, regulatory bodies can be conªdent that regulation in-
crementally expanding the public trust doctrine will not create tak-
ings liability. To be sure, regulatory bodies should be careful not to 
expand the public trust doctrine too quickly or stretch it too far be-
yond its traditional scope. 280  They should identify the traditional 
scope of the state’s public trust doctrine and cautiously broaden the 
doctrine to reºect changing needs and circumstances.281  However, 
because Palazzolo deªned background principles as “those common, 
shared understandings of permissible limitations derived from a State’s 
legal tradition,”282 regulations protecting land outside the traditional 
scope of trust resources are likely to be immune from takings because 
they will be considered background principles.283 One technique for 
placing restrictions on previously unrecognized trust resources is to 
focus on the ecological relationship between the targeted land and 
traditional public trust resources. 284  Under this approach, explicit 
regulatory language can mitigate against a taking because a failure to 
regulate adjacent non-trust land may endanger trust resources.285
 In addition, because the public trust doctrine plays a role in the 
Penn Central multi-factor test, even if a regulatory body cannot prevail 
on a takings claim, it can utilize the doctrine to mitigate damages.286 
Where traditional or potential public trust resources are protected by 
government restrictions, regulatory bodies faced with a takings chal-
lenge should argue that a landowner’s proposed use of land will in-
jure a resource held in trust by the state.287 Since constructive knowl-
edge of the public trust doctrine is an essential element in evaluating 
investment-backed expectations,288 compensation for an owner’s lost 
opportunity in a successful takings claim should therefore be reduced 
                                                                                                                      
279 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). 
280 See supra Part III.D. 
281 See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 
1972); see also Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1974) (holding that public trust 
doctrine is “sufªciently ºexible to encompass changing public needs”). 
282 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001) (emphasis added). 
283 See id.; see also Dowling, supra note 12, at 90–91. 
284 See Sarahan, supra note 38, at 573. 
285 See id. 
286 See id. at 576–77. 
287 See id. 
288 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027, 1029; Karam v. State, 705 
A.2d 1221, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998); Sarahan, supra note 38, at 564. 
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to the value of investment-backed expectations as limited by the pub-
lic trust-based use restrictions.289
 Finally, the fact that the doctrine underlies a modern takings 
analysis—coupled with states’ responsibilities to protect trust re-
sources—demonstrates that the majority of modern environmental 
protection laws, like wetlands protection, can hardly be characterized as 
overreaching.290 Many environmental protection restrictions could be 
characterized as codiªcations of background principles like the public 
trust doctrine, and thus do no more than that which could have been 
achieved by courts applying common law principles.291 Further, in de-
scribing background principles as limitations “derived from a State’s legal 
tradition,”292 Palazzolo strongly implies that regulations which reasona-
bly expand existing background principles may themselves be consid-
ered background principles.293 Thus, state and local regulatory bodies 
can be conªdent in pursuing novel environmental protection of lands 
held in trust for the public—such as wetlands, forests, and parks— 
without fear of takings challenges.294 Such legislation merely codiªes 
the public trust doctrine or is a reasonable extension of it.295
C. Property Rights Should Be Conceptualized Within a  
Community-Based Paradigm 
 As Hope Babcock explains, “the use of private property has always 
been constrained by transcendent social or communal obligations.”296 
Indeed, the public trust doctrine’s role in a takings analysis suggests 
that property rights are perhaps more communal than generally ac-
knowledged, and reveals that it may make sense to think about prop-
erty rights from an interconnected, community-based perspective.297  
                                                                                                                      
 
289 See Karam v. State, 705 A.2d 1221, 1226–29 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998); R.W. Docks & 
Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781, 790–91 (Wis. 2001). 
290 See supra Parts III, IV, V; supra notes 273–77 and accompanying text. 
291 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
292 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 603, 630 (2001) (emphasis added). 
293 See Dowling, supra note 12, at 91. 
294 See id. 
295 See id. 
296 Babcock, supra note 4, at 897. 
297 See Babcock, supra note 4, at 898–901. Babcock explains that, in the context of wild-
life, the public trust doctrine offers 
an antidote to our culture’s loss of a sense of community and to our modern 
inability to see our society as individuals arrayed in a series of continuous in-
teractions with each other and with our surroundings. . . . 
 . . . . 
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American courts historically have invoked the public trust doctrine and 
other similar common law doctrines in order to protect shared re-
sources like beaches, rivers, and wildlife in the face of strong private 
property interests.298  Courts applying the public trust doctrine to a 
modern takings analysis continue this deep-seated property law tradi-
tion that a property “right” is more than the power to use and consume 
a purchased resource; they afªrm that property rights encompass a le-
gal relationship between an individual and her community.299
 The fact that the public trust doctrine is infused into the takings 
analysis informs landowners that they are not entitled to compensa-
tion if a regulation requires them to cease using property in a way that 
harms the community.300 Land is not simply a commodity valued by its 
market price, the public trust doctrine reminds landowners; it also is 
burdened by the duty to conform its uses with the public’s needs and 
values.301 To be sure, many landowners mistakenly believe that they 
have an inherent right to use purchased property as they choose.302 As 
the doctrine’s application to takings reveals, however, landowners 
should not expect absolute property use protection. 303  The public 
trust doctrine limits the unfettered right of a landowner to use her 
parcel as she sees ªt, and, should the owner claim that a regulation 
prohibits her from using her parcel as she wishes, precludes the 
owner from recovery.304
 Further, the application of the public trust doctrine to takings 
reafªrms the notion that property rights continually evolve according 
to community needs.305 Critics of the inclusion of the public trust doc-
trine as a background principle are concerned that regulatory bodies 
will justify land use restrictions by expanding the scope of public trust 
rights.306 But the public trust doctrine has never been static.307 Rather, 
                                                                                                                      
 . . . Lucas, oddly enough, with its incorporation of common law into tak-
ings jurisprudence, may allow us to regain that sense of neighborliness. 
Id. at 900–01. 
298 See supra Part I. 
299 See Babcock, supra note 4, at 900. 
300 See id. at 897. 
301 See id. at 902. 
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303 See id. 
304 See id. 
305 See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 
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307 See supra Part I. 
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it has continually conformed to changing societal needs and circum-
stances.308  While abrupt shifts in the doctrine’s application cannot 
serve as a defense to a takings claim, cautious expansion of the public 
trust doctrine is hardly without precedent.309 It should surprise no 
landowner in a soft-sand state, for example, that the public trust doc-
trine may shift with a migrating coastline.310 That several courts have 
concluded that the public trust doctrine underlies a modern takings 
analysis, therefore, indicates a growing recognition of adaptable 
property rights ultimately subject to public use and enjoyment.311 Be-
cause the public trust doctrine evolves—and is considered both a 
background principle and a constructive limitation on investment-
backed expectations—property rights burdened by the doctrine con-
tinually evolve according to the community’s changing needs.312
 Indeed, the application of the public trust doctrine as a threshold 
issue in a takings analysis suggests adopting a fundamental shift in our 
conception of private property rights.313 Whereas a conventional per-
spective of private property rights views land as an expendable resource 
and tool for human use and consumption, the modern takings analy-
sis’s deference to the public trust doctrine indicates a growing accep-
tance of Professor Sax’s economy of nature.314 Where the public trust 
doctrine serves as a background principle or restricts a landowner’s 
investment-backed expectations, private use rights give way to commu-
nity needs.315 The doctrine’s complete defense to a takings claim is an 
afªrmation of ecological and communal interconnectedness; it reºects 
a perspective that a landowner’s relationship to the land is colored by 
the land’s relationship to the landowner’s community.316
Conclusion 
 Any evaluation of a regulatory or physical takings claim requires 
a careful consideration of the public trust doctrine. Property owner-
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ship in the United States does not provide landowners with a right to 
lay harm to valuable resources held in trust for the public, nor does it 
require courts to award landowners compensation when a legislature 
acts to restrict the use of such resources. State and local regulatory 
bodies therefore can be conªdent in promoting environmental pro-
tection of a slowly growing list of public trust resources by drafting 
regulations explicit in their recognition of the public trust doctrine. 
